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Introduction
Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget constraint implies strong testable restrictions on the properties of demand functions. Empirical applications to data on households however often reject these restrictions. In particular, such data frequently show a failure of Slutsky symmetry -the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compensated price responses (see for example Deaton (1990) , Browning and Meghir (1991) , Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) ).
From the theoretical point of view, the inadequacy of the single consumer model as a description of decision making for households with more than one member has also long been recognised. Attempts to reconcile this model with the existence of several sets of individual preferences have been made for instance by Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974 Becker ( , 1991 but rely upon restrictive assumptions about preferences or within-household decision mechanisms (see Bergstrom, 1989; Cornes and Silva, 1999) .
A large body of recent research has investigated alternative models accommodating more realistic descriptions of within-household decision-making processes. Efficiency of household decisions holds in a number of models of household behaviour which have been suggested: for instance in the Nash bargaining models of Manser and Brown (1980) , McElroy and Horney (1981) and McElroy (1990) , and in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) . However, it is not a property of noncooperative models such as those of Ulph (1988) and Chen and Woolley (2001) .
An important advance is made by Browning and Chiappori (1998) , who
show that under the assumption of efficient within-household decision making, the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member household is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank k − 1.
Tests on Canadian data are found to reject symmetry for couples, but not for single individual households. The hypothesis that the departure from symmetry for the sample of couples has rank 1, as implied by the assumption of efficiency, is also not rejected. This work is important not only in filling a gap in our theoretical understanding of demand behaviour but also in the prospect which it presents of reconciling demand theory and data on consumer behaviour.
While the inability of Browning and Chiappori to reject the symmetry and rank condition for couples is intriguing, it is not clear what power it
has, if any, as a test of efficiency of intrahousehold decisions, unless one understands the nature of the departure from symmetry under the principal alternative models of household decision making.
If noncooperative models give rise to a departure of similar rank as that obtained under the assumption of efficiency, this would obviously not be a feature of demand behaviour which would be of use in discriminating between these alternative assumptions. On the other hand, if the departure from symmetry under noncooperative behaviour is of greater rank, then the Browning-Chiappori result not only reconciles assumptions of optimising behaviour with demand data, but also provides evidence in favour of the collectively rational model against other descriptions of within-household decision 4 making.
1
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in noncooperative models with several voluntarily contributed public goods. Models of this type warrant attention in their own right as marking an opposite extreme to fully efficient models of the sort described above. They are also interesting in so far as the equilibria in such models can be considered as the fallback position in bargaining models as suggested, for example, in Chen and Woolley (2001) .
Models of voluntarily contributed public goods have relevance beyond analysis of household demand. When they involve more than two players, these models can be used to represent a variety of situations involving private contributions to public goods either in the national or international context.
What distinguishes what we have termed the "household Nash equilibrium model" from the general Nash equilibrium model is the number of agents, which is two in the case considered here.
We concentrate attention on interior equilibria in which each partner contributes to all the public goods.
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Such equilibria have important income pooling properties which help render the description of demand properties tractable. In section 2, we establish conditions under which there can be no more than one such equilibrium and derive conditions on preferences and income shares allowing for existence. In section 3, we show that equilibrium quantities vary with prices and household income in ways compatible with 1 In general, Nash bargaining and other specific cooperative models should not give rise to a departure from symmetry of a lower rank than that of the collective model. See McElroy and Horney (1981, 1990 ) and Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( ,1991 for a discussion of price effects in the Nash bargaining model. 2 Specifically, what we mean is that neither partner would like to reduce the household's spending on any public good but cannot because they do not contribute to it.
the adding up and homogeneity properties of unitary demands and that negativity and symmetry properties will generally be violated, as in the collective model. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric matrix and another the rank of which never exceeds one plus the number of public goods. The departure from symmetry therefore typically falls considerably short of full rank. Section 4 is devoted to the properties of demands for specific forms of preferences. Indeed, additional restrictions on preferences reduce the rank further, but it falls to the rank one departure seen in the collective setting only under very restrictive assumptions -for example, separability of public goods and identical preferences. These results imply that the Browning-Chiappori assumption of efficiency can be tested against other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation. Section 5 concludes. Each person decides on the purchases made from their income so as to maximise their utility subject to the spending decisions of their partner. We can write the agents' problems as
where inequalities should be read where appropriate as applying to each element of the relevant vector. We assume at least one private good for each partner and at least one public good are consumed in positive quantities in all equilibria considered below.
This problem can be considered as one where each agent has to choose the level of the public goods for the household, subject to the constraint that this level is greater than or equal to the contribution of the other agent.
Given that y
, and similarly for B, the agents'problems can be re-written as: 
and
where f 
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Equilibria of this type have important properties. satisfying (1) and (2) and
Lemma 1 If both public and private goods are normal for both partners, in the sense that
a ≤ p f i y ≤ 1 − a for some a > 0, i = A, B,(5)
(Income pooling for private goods) these quantities depend only on
(y, p, P ).
Proof. By substitution between (1) and (2), we have the equilibrium
Defining
we have
so that the value of x A in household Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of ξ
Given (5) In what follows we assume normality of public and private goods in the sense of (5). Let us denote the mappings from (y, p, P ) to these unique interior equilibrium private good vectors by θ A (y, p, P ) and θ B (y, p, P ).
Lemma 2 1. (Existence and uniqueness for public goods) There exists a unique interior household Nash equilibrium if and only if
in which case
(Income pooling for public goods) equilibrium public good quantities depend only on (y, p, P ).
Proof. Given that private good quantities in interior equilibrium are determined uniquely by Lemma 1, (3) and (4) provide alternative equations for equilibrium quantities of the public goods and (8) is a necessary and sufficient condition for these to coincide. If they do coincide, then income pooling for public goods follows immediately from the income pooling result for private goods. These quantities constitute an interior household equilibrium if the nonnegativity constraints bind on neither household member, which will be the case if each partner has income sufficient to purchase the interior equilibrium private goods quantities θ A (y, p, P ) and θ B (y, p, P ) as stated in (9).
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are considered for the case of one public good and k contributors by Varian (1986, 1992) and Fraser (1992 the private goods at E so that E is the unique household Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore it is clear that small changes in the income shares will not alter the location of this equilibrium, which is the income pooling result.
Noninterior equilibria will pertain in cases of sufficiently extreme income shares and the locus of all equilibria is given by the line CEB.
Existence depends critically on compatibility of public good demands in a way that requires a certain coincidence of individual preferences, which may be more or less thoroughgoing depending upon assumptions made about separability of public goods in individual preferences.
Let us denote the mapping from (y, p, P ) to interior equilibrium public goods quantities, if these exist, by Θ(y, p, P ) and assume that the equilibrium mappings are all differentiable. One implication of interior equilibrium that we make use of below is a requirement that public good Engel curves be proportional in the sense that each partner should wish to spend household funds allocated to the public goods in similar proportions at the margin. To state this result, define
Lemma 3 (Engel curve proportionality for public goods) Individual Engel
5 Note that α and β are scalars and are defined by slopes of demand functions rather than slopes of equilibrium conditions. curves for public goods are proportional in the sense that
Proof. Differentiating (3) and (4) gives
Differentiating (1) and (2) gives
Substituting and solving simultaneously gives
and therefore
from which (10) follows immediately. This is clearly a strong restriction but does not exhaust the implications of existence of such an equilibrium. Interior equilibria exist only if public goods choices made by the partners are compatible in the sense of (8). Since both partners face the same relative prices, the same total quantities of the jointly contributed public goods can constitute solutions to the individual optimisation problems only if marginal rates of substitution between these 13 public goods are the same for both partners. Equivalently, we require the existence of public goods quantities Q solving
for some λ
This is a system of equations which is clearly typically insoluble (since there are n + 2 unknowns with which to satisfy 2n + 1 equations including the budget constraint). Nonetheless restrictions on preferences which either tie together the equilibrium private good quantities in a useful way or which enforce some sort of separability between public and private goods choices can make an interior equilibrium possible.
In particular, we may note that interior equilibria exist if private goods can be partitioned,
in such a way that individual preferences take the weakly separable form
for some υ i (., .), i = A, B and some common subutility function ν(., .).
Lemma 4 If individual preferences take the form (12) then there exists a range of income shares over which there exists an interior household Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let the price vector for private goods be similarly partitioned p = (p 0 , p 1 ). Given weak separability of (q i 1 , Q) in each partner's preferences and the common subutility function, we know that two stage budgetting will hold (Blackorby, Primont and Russell 1978) with a common lower stage.
Therefore there exists a function g(.) such that
Given uniqueness of private goods quantities in interior equilibrium, by Lemma 1, and the symmetry of these equations it must be that θ A 1 (y, p, P ) = θ B 1 (y, p, P ) = θ * 1 (y, p, P ) for some common θ * 1 (y, p, P ) so equilibrium quantities of the separable private goods are equal for the two partners. Furthermore, using weak separability and the fact that ν(.) is common again, (11) simplifies to
P which is generically soluble since it involves only n + 2 equations. Hence (8) can be satisfied and an interior household Nash equilibrium exists for income shares satisfying (9).
This class of preferences covers all particular cases in which we are aware that interior equilibria exist. It covers, for example, the extreme case of identical preferences
for some common ν(., .). In this case, since there exists a unique interior equilibrium (given appropriate income shares) defined by equations which are fully symmetric, the partners consume identical quantities in equilibrium:
(y, p, P ) for some common θ * (y, p, P ).
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It also covers the case in which public goods are separable with a common public goods subutility function
and therefore, trivially, also the case usually considered in which there is only one public good, n = 1. Both (13) and (14) can be shown to imply particularly special properties for equilibrium demands and we pay particular attention to them below in section (4). 
Adding up and homogeneity
It is easy to establish that the household Nash equilibrium quantities satisfy adding-up and homogeneity. Proof.
1. Adding up of demands in household Nash equilibrium follows from the fact that the partners are on their individual budget constraints and the sum of their demands therefore satisfies the household budget constraint.
2. Equilibrium quantities satisfying (1), (2) and (3) and (4) will satisfy homogeneity given homogeneity of the individual demand functions.
Negativity and symmetry
Negativity and symmetry are less simply dealt with. These are concerned in the case of the unitary model with the properties of the Slutsky matrix, the matrix of price responses at fixed household utility. Since household utility is undefined in a noncooperative setting, no such matrix is defined but we can adopt the Browning and Chiappori (1998) notion of the "pseudo-Slutsky matrix". This in the current context is the matrix Noting that at the equilibrium, θ
, p, P ) and similarly for B and for the public goods, equilibrium quantities responses follow
N 2 dp dP
Since we work in terms of household purchases q and Q, we have therefore
where
is an appropriate aggregating matrix.
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The matrix M has a block lower triangular structure which makes it readily invertible. In a convenient representation
The pseudo-Slutsky matrix now follows from:
Note that the terms in Φ are all elements of the underlying true individual Slutsky matrices corresponding to the individual decision problems
Lemma 5 The pseudo Slutsky matrix admits the decomposition
.
and R
is an idempotent matrix of rank n − 1. 
Identical preferences
Under identical preferences, interior equilibria are symmetric in the sense that private good quantities are identical for the two partners. This reduces the rank of the departure from symmetry and negativity by one.
Theorem 3 Given identical preferences (13), the pseudo-Slutsky matrix Ψ
is the sum of a negative semidefinite symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank no greater than n.
Proof. Since private goods quantities are identical, the two outer products of vectors in ∆ are identical and therefore ∆ has rank n
Separability of public goods
Separability of public goods with a common public goods subutility as in (14) offers an interesting case. In particular we know that the separable structure allows us to write
for some common function G(.).
where G X is the partial derivative of G(.) with respect to its first argument.
Substituting the first of these expressions into the definition of R i and noting
where we may note that ψ, being the Slutsky matrix corresponding to the preferences ν(Q), is itself symmetric and negative semidefinite.
Theorem 4 Given separable and identical preferences over public goods (14) , the pseudo-Slutsky matrix Ψ is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank no greater than 2.
Proof. By (16) and (17) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in the Nash equilibrium with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. This noncooperative model is the polar case to the cooperative model of Browning and Chiappori (1998). In reality, neither the assumption of fully efficient cooperation nor of complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate description of typical household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme cases can be seen as a first step towards understanding of a more adequate model.
We focus on interior equilibria in which each partner contributes to all the public goods. Although this involves assuming nonbinding the constraint that neither partner should spend more than their private income on goods of private interest to themselves, this is anyway likely to be a fairly soft constraint in real circumstances where the distinction between partners' incomes is neither practically nor legally clearcut.
We derive the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and we show that adding-up and homogeneity hold. We show that the nature of the departure from unitary demand properties in household Nash equilibrium is qualitatively similar to that in collectively efficient models in that negativity and symmetry of compensated price responses is not guaranteed.
The counterpart to the Slutsky matrix can be shown to depart from negativity and symmetry by a matrix of bounded rank but this rank typically exceeds that found in the collective model unless strong auxiliary restrictions are placed on preferences. In the Nash equilibrium, the deviation from symmetry falls to the rank one deviation seen in the collective setting only under very restrictive assumptions -for example, separability of public goods and identical preferences. However, under the sole assumption of separability of the public goods, the deviation is a matrix of rank 2. These results imply that the Browning-Chiappori assumption of efficiency can be tested against other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation.
Appendix
To derive the decomposition of Lemma 5 it is useful to note the adding up Finally, applying similar reasoning to the final submatrix, 
